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In standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and
on-the-job search, renegotiation is permitted without requirement of a credible
threat. Workers trigger renegotiation whenever they have a new outside option
that could raise their wages. In this note I modify the model to be consistent
with renegotiation by mutual agreement and I show that estimating the model
without imposing credible threats for renegotiation generates downward bias in
the estimates of the bargaining power.
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1 Introduction
In this note I discuss on threat points in equilibrium search models with strategic wage
bargaining, on-the-job search and between rms Bertrand competition. If contracts
are revised by mutual agreement, renegotiation occurs only if one party can credibly
threat to break the match. In order to limit the rm's impetus to renegotiate wages
when the poaching rms are not more available, contract renegotiation by mutual
agreement is a crucial ingredient to sustain wages determination by between rms
Bertrand competition. I show that credible threats are not required for workers in
equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search in
the current literature. Estimating the model without imposing credible threats for
renegotiation may generate downward bias in the estimated worker bargaining power.
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1Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) extend the idea by Burdett and Mortensen that
labor market frictions and on-the-job search matter in wage determination. They
propose an alternative wage setting mechanism that allows rms to compete for workers
 a la Bertrand in wages. Workers are allowed to search on the job, and when they receive
an outside oer, they can use this oer to renegotiate wages. Outside oers are not
supposed to be available forever, and so contracts which can only be renegotiated by
mutual agreement are an essential component in this game. Through this kind of
contracts, the rm is committing itself to pay the new bargained wage whenever the
match is convenient for both parties. The contract constrains the rm to maintain the
bargained wage also when the workers outside option becomes again the unemployment.
In this context, contract renegotiation is well dened in terms of mutual agreement.
If the worker has a credible threat, ie: an outside option that provides him with higher
utility that the current contract, he can trigger renegotiation. The rm may nd it
convenient to renegotiate to avoid the dissolution of match, which implies zero utility.
As stated in Malcomson (1997, 1999), contracts that can only be renegotiated by
mutual consent are a natural assumption, with strong empirical support. This kind of
contracts is consistent with a number of legal and economic facts. Mutual agreement
is indeed a prerequisite to wage renegotiation in many European countries. In the U.S.
the empirical evidence reviewed in Malcomson (1997,1999) reveals that wage changes
occur much less frequently than would be consistent with a strict application of the
employment-at-will rule, suggesting that mutual consent, although not an explicit legal
provision, may be common practice.
The wage setting mechanism proposed by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) has
been also used in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), Postel-Vinay and Turon (2009),
and other papers. However, a more interesting setup allows the worker to take some of
the surplus through Nash negotiation, as proposed by Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2006, CPVR henceforth) and Dey and Flinn (2006). This setting is appealing mainly
due to two reasons: First, it is consistent with within rm wage increases, which have
been shown to be empirically important (See Farber 1999). Second, it disentangles the
wage negotiation from the expected duration of the match. Therefore, convexity of
payos can be guaranteed and the Nash bargaining solution applies (see Shimer 2005).
This wage setting scenario has been used in a number of recent papers; such as Flinn
(2006), Lentz (2010), Yamaguchi (2010), and Flinn and Mabli (2010).
In the model without surplus splitting (ie: with  = 0), every worker receives the
value of his outside option. Therefore, any oer coming from a rm that is better than
the rm currently used to set the wage, is a credible threat and generates renegotiation.
When the surplus is split, the denition of a credible threat is less straightforward. If
the worker has positive bargaining power, there is a gap between the value of the
current job and the outside option used to set the wage. Therefore, there are some
rms that are better than the rm used to set the wage, which are not good enough
2to trigger renegotiation, because they do no represent credible threats.
In this note I apply a dierent denition of contracts1 to the environment presented
in CPVR. As in Postel-Vinay and Turon (2009), I argue that contracts stipulate a
constant wage and are only renegotiable by mutual consent in continuing matches.
In other words, no rm or worker can force their match partner to revise the wage
against the latter's interest, unless the former has a credible threat to leave the match.
The implications of this wage rule for wage dynamics were analyzed theoretically by
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993): In continuing matches, if one party has a credible
threat to dissolve the match, i.e. if the value of his outside option exceeds the value
he gets from the existing relationship, the other party consents to wage renegotiation.
A numerical exercise shows that if the model that requires credible threats to trigger
renegotiation, is the true data generating process, a structural estimation of the CPVR
model would produce downward biased estimates of the worker bargaining power. This
feature is particularly interesting in this context, because most of the estimates of the
worker bargaining power in CPVR have been found to be surprisingly small.
To allow renegotiation only through credible threats has also implications on the
eect over wages of shocks to productivity. Although this is not modeled in this note,
it is a natural extension to the basic model. Postel-Vinay and Turon (2009) argues that
within a standard job search model with on-the-job search, the requirement of credible
threats for renegotiation acts as a quantitatively plausible \internal propagation mech-
anism" of i.i.d. productivity shocks into persistent wage shocks2. Models with shocks
to productivity where only workers (but not rms) are always able to renegotiate, are
described in the literature on implicit contracts and downward wage rigidity.3 Down-
ward rigid wages are a consequence of workers' risk aversion and rms' risk neutrality.
To justify downward rigid wages is not straightforward in an environment where both
players are assumed to be risk neutral.
The rest of the note is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the model. Numerical
examples are presented in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
1When CPVR describe the theory, they argue that their \wage contracts stipulate a xed wage
that can be renegotiated by mutual agreement only: renegotiations thus occur only if one party can
credibly threaten the other to leave the match for good if the latter refuses to renegotiate" (p. 327).
But below they state that renegotiation takes place if an oer from a rm better than the rm used
as outside option to set the wage, arrives (p. 359). In Section 2, I show that both concepts may
imply dierent sets of rms. In Yamaguchi (2010 p. 604), the wage setting is equivalent to the one
presented in CPVR and contracts are also supposed to be renegotiated by credible threats.
2In Postel-Vinay and Turon (2009) credible threats do not imply dierent thresholds to start
renegotiation between the incumbent and the poaching rm as in CPVR. Although the model by
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2009) allows for Bertrand competition, it builds on the wage posting model
presented in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In the latter model the bargaining power is assumed to
be zero, therefore every oer from a rm which is better than the current outside option represents
a credible threat. In a recent paper, Robin (2011) the sequential auction model presented in the
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) is extended to allow wage bargaining and productivity shocks. In the
model presented in Robin (2011) credible threats are well dened because rms are assumed to be
homogeneous.
3For example, papers by Azariadis (1975) and Harris and Holmstron (1982).
32 The Model
I propose a model that builds on Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006), but assuming
that wage contracts are only altered when one of the outside-option constraints becomes
binding. The economy is assumed to be stationary and populated by innitely lived
rms and workers. Time is continuous, all agents are risk neutral and discount future
income at rate  > 0.
When unemployed, workers receive a ow utility b. The original model presented
in CPVR allows for worker heterogeneity related with the eciency units each worker
provides per unit of time. Worker heterogeneity is important to estimate the model but
as the model is written at the match level, (ie: one worker-one rm) dierences among
workers have no implications over the model predictions that this note is interested on.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible worker heterogeneity is not considered
and workers are assumed to provide 1 eciency unit per unit of time.
Every rm is characterized by its productivity (p). I assume that p is distributed
across rms according to a given cumulative distribution function  (p), which is contin-
uously dierentiable with support [pmin;pmax]: This source of heterogeneity is perfectly
observable by every agent in the economy. The opportunity cost of recruiting a worker
is zero. A worker working in a rm p; produces p.
Unemployed workers receive job oers at a Poisson rate 0 > 0. Employed workers
may also search for a better job while employed and they receive job oers at a Poisson
rate 1 > 0. Searching while unemployed as searching while employed has no cost.
Employment relationships are exogenously destroyed at a constant rate  > 0; leaving
the worker unemployed and the rm with nothing.
As in CPVR wages are set by Nash-Bargaining. When a worker comes from unem-
ployment, his outside option is the unemployment. Let V0 be the value of unemploy-
ment, and V (p;w) be the lifetime expected utility of a worker employed at a rm with
productivity p who receives a wage w. The surplus is the dierence between the maxi-
mum value the worker can get in that job, V (p;p), and the value of being unemployed,
V0. Therefore, the bargained wage, w0(p), that a worker coming from unemployment
receives in a rm with productivity p, satises:
V (p;w0(p)) = V (p;p) + (1   )V0
When an employed worker receives an outside oer from a more productive rm
with productivity p+, the worker changes rm and negotiates the new wage, w(p+;p),
according to the new surplus. The surplus is dened as the dierence between the
maximum value that the worker can receive in the new rm, V (p+;p+), and the max-
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4When an employed worker, who is currently receiving a wage w(p;p0); contacts a
rm with productivity p , and p  is lower than the productivity of his current rm, p,
he will not move to the new rm. but if the new rm is good enough (ie : p  is higher
than a threshold q(p;p0)), the worker will renegotiate and set a new wage, w(p;p ),
with the current rm. w(p;p ) solves:
V (p;w(p;p
 )) = V (p;p) + (1   )V (p
 ;p
 )
Therefore, the value of a job, in a rm with productivity p when the outside option
is set according to an alternative rm with productivity p0, is:












The dierence between the wage setting mechanism proposed in this note and the
one presented in CPVR is in the denition of q(p;p0):
In this note, wage contracts stipulate a constant wage and are only renegotiable
by mutual consent in continuing matches. In other words, no rm or worker can force
their match partner to revise the wage against the latter's interest, unless the former
has a credible threat to leave the match. According to this denition of wage contracts,
the worker will be only able to trigger renegotiation if the maximum value than the
poaching rm can oer him is higher than the value of the current job. Therefore the
threshold ~ q(p;p0), which denes good enough rms to start renegotiation, is implicitly
dened by:
V (p;w(p;p
0)) = V (~ q(p;p
0); ~ q(p;p
0))
According to wage contract in CPVR, and in the subsequent papers mentioned
in the introduction, employees are allowed to renegotiate whenever they have a new
outside option which provides them the opportunity to obtain a wage gain. As rene-
gotiation takes place only if it is in the worker's interest, there will be renegotiation if
the new poaching rm is better than the rm currently used to set the wage. The rm
used as outside option to set the wage w(p;p0) is p0. Therefore their threshold which
denes good enough rms to start renegotiation, is simply p0.
Lemma 1 If p0 < p and 0 <  < 1; under CPVR there are some rms which do not
represent a credible threat, which may be used to trigger renegotiation (ie : ~ q(p;p0) > p0):
5Proof. The proof is straightforward. The wage that a worker receives in rm p
with outside option p0 is given by V (p;w(p;p0)) = (1   )V (p0;p0) + V (p;p). The
threshold that imposes credible threats for renegotiation is dened by V (p;w(p;p0)) =
V (~ q(p;p0); ~ q(p;p0)). Therefore V (~ q(p;p0); ~ q(p;p0)) = (1   )V (p0;p0) + V (p;p). Given
that V (x;x) is strictly increasing in x;4 if 0 <  < 1 and p0 < p; we have that
V (p0;p0) < V (~ q(p;p0); ~ q(p;p0)) < V (p;p) ) p0 < ~ q(p;p0) < p
The threshold used in CPVR says that workers will renegotiate whenever they
obtain a higher wage, but it does not imply credible threats. When a worker contacts
a rm whit productivity p , and p0 < p  < ~ q(p;p0), he will not permanently change
employer, because the maximum utility he obtains in the poaching rm is smaller
than the utility obtained in the current one (ie : V (q ;q ) < V (~ q(p;p0); ~ q(p;p0)) =
V (p;w(p;p0))). Although the oer coming from p  does not represents a credible
threat, the worker could take that oer and switch to the rm with productivity p 
for an insignicant period of time, and contact again the old rm to set a new contract
that takes V (p ;p ) as the worker outside option. For the old rm it may still be
protable to keep the worker in the new situation (ie: because p > p ) and therefore
the new wage is negotiated considering the poaching rm as the outside option.
Although this scheme is ecient for the workers, if contracts do not explicitly ban
this kind of threats, rms are going to follow the same strategy. After the outside
option has disappeared,5 the rm would layo the worker for an insignicant period of
time and then renegotiate a new wage taking the unemployment as the outside option.
This scenario implies that unemployment is always the outside option as in Bartolucci
(2011) and Flinn and Mabli (2011), and between rms Bertrand competition does not
4Note that if p0 = p; the threshold ~ q(p;p0) is equal to p: (ie : V (p;p) = V (~ q(p;p0); ~ q(p;p0)) =) p =
~ q(p;p0)): Therefore simplifying (1):
( +  + 1  F(p))V (p;p) (2)
= p + V0 + 1
pmax Z
p
[V (x;x) + (1   )V (p;p)]dF(x)
Rearranging (2)
( +  + 1  F(p))V (p;p) (3)
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F(x)
> 0 Y x 
5Outside oers do not last for ever, and so when jobs are exogenously destroyed, workers go to the
unemployment and not to rm used as outside options when the wage was set.
6hold6.
3 Numerical Exercise
This section presents a simple numerical exercise that illustrates the quantitative impli-
cations of omitting the requirement of credible threats for renegotiation in equilibrium
search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search, in the estimation
of the bargaining power.
In this particular model the estimation of the parameters that describe workers
and rms productivity and frictions patterns, is not supposed to be aected by the
choice of the threshold for renegotiation.7 This is because both models, with and
without credible threats, generate the same set of constrains on the estimation of all
the parameters excluding the bargaining power.8
The eect of the requirement of credible threats for renegotiation in the estimation
of the bargaining power is particularly interesting also because the estimates of this
coecient produced by models without credible threats has been shown to be surpris-
ingly low. Moreover, some of the estimates of  presented in CPVR are found to be
signicantly negative.
Both models are calibrated to match the empirical results presented in CPVR. The
numerical exercise is simple, the bargaining power in CPVR model is calibrated to
match the mean of log wages generated by the model that imposes credible threats.
This exercise is replicated for a grid of  ranging between 0:05 and 0:5. The bargaining
power recovered from the CPVR's, is nally compared with the true bargaining power
used in the data generating process.
Both models are solved by value function iteration and wages are aggregated ac-
cording to the steady state distribution of rms. The steady state distribution of rms
is a function of the transition parameters, 1,  and the primitive distribution of rms
 (p), that is assumed to be log-normal.9
Figure 1 shows that the estimates of the worker bargaining power are biased. The
true bargaining power is between 2 and 6 points higher than the bargaining power
recovered if we use the model that does not impose credible threats to trigger renego-
tiation. This dierence is higher when the bargaining power is between 0.2 and 0.4.
6Formally, between rms Bertrand competition may still hold, but only in the moment of the
outside oer. As the model is considered in continuous time, it has no eect over wages.
7Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) or Bartolucci (2010) propose to estimate the parameters
related with the worker and the rm productivity, only using rm level data on output and productive
inputs, but not wages. In these papers, parameters that describe frictions are also estimated without
data on wages, only using duration data at the worker level.
8Same of these constrains are: no assortative matching between the worker type and the rm type,
constant return to scale in the production function, ecient transitions between rms, among others.
See Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) for details
9MATA codes to solve both models are available from the author upon request.
7Figure 1: Potential Bias in the Estimated Bargaining Power
The later interval includes most of the current estimates in the literature.10
4 Conclusion
In this note I discuss on threat points in equilibrium search models with strategic wage
bargaining, on-the-job search and between rms Bertrand competition. If contracts are
assumed to be revised by mutual agreement, renegotiation occurs only if one party can
credibly threat the other to break the match. This kind of contracts constrains the rm
to maintain the bargained wage also when the workers outside option becomes again
the unemployment. Therefore, contract renegotiation by mutual agreement is a crucial
ingredient to sustain wages determination by between rms Bertrand competition.
In standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-
job search, employees are allowed to renegotiate whenever they have a new outside
option that generates a wage increase. I show that within the groups of potential rms
that may generate a wage gain, there is a non empty set of rms that do not represent a
credible threat, in the sense that the maximum value that they can oer to the worker
is strictly lower than the value of the current job.
I propose a modication to the environment presented in CPVR in the denition of
contracts. I assume that contracts stipulate a constant wage and are only renegotiable
by mutual consent in continuing matches. I nally show that estimating the model
without imposing credible threats for renegotiation may generate downward bias in the
estimated worker bargaining power.
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